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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PARCELS
TO THE HOLDENS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE.

The elements of a boundary by acquiescence claim are not in dispute: (1)
occupation to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings; (2) mutual
acquiescence in the line as a boundary; (3) for at least 20 years; (4) by adjoining
landowners. The Holdens do not dispute that boundary by acquiescence is an affirmative
defense, and that it must be established by clear and convincing evidence. (See Brief of
Appellants at 20).
A.

Acquiescence in the fence as a boundary.

As discussed at length in the Aults5 opening brief, the Holdens did not, and cannot,
establish the second element of their defense, acquiescence in the fence as a boundary.
The Holdens acknowledge that the fence in question was not erected as a boundary (Brief
of Appellees at 19), but argue that "through their indolence, the Aults acquiesced to the
fence as a boundary line. The Holdens possessed the property for almost thirty years and
even built structures on the property in the 1980's, yet the Aults did nothing/' (Id. at 2021).
The Aults have cited (and the Holdens have not refuted) case law observing that
indolence occurs only when a landowner has reason to know that a claim is or may be
asserted. (See Brief of Appellants at 25-28). The Holdens suggest, however, that the
mere existence of a fence anywhere other than precisely on a boundary line automatically
places landowners on notice of an adverse claim by neighbors on the other side of the
1

fence.

(Brief of Appellees at 29).

This contention would, in effect, eliminate the

requirement of acquiescence in a fence or monument as a boundary, and instead require
acquiesce only in a fence itself, contrary to half a century of judicial pronouncements.
{See Brief of Appellants at 21-23, and cases cited).
In the court below, there simply was no evidence that the Aults acquiesced in the
fence as a boundary, and the doctrine is inapplicable. The same conclusion is reached
under the reasoning of Wilkinson Family Farm v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229-232 (Utah App.
1999), which held that "parties may not, knowing where the true boundary line is,
establish a boundary line by acquiescence." {See Brief of Appellants at 23-25).]
The Holdens' argument that Wilkinson is inconsistent with Staker v. Ainsworth,
785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990), errs in its assumption that consideration of actual knowledge
essentially reintroduces the element of objective uncertainty into the analysis. As this
Court explained in Staker, the short-lived "objective uncertainty" element could only be
satisfied with a narrow, unworkable type of proof. A claimant had to produce "some
objectively measurable circumstance in the record title or in the reasonably available
survey information (or other technique by which record title information was located on
the ground) that would have prevented a landowner, as a practical matter, from being
reasonably certain about the true location. By the same token, a claimant cannot assert

Although a holding that mutual knowledge of the true boundary precludes application of
the doctrine would entitle the Aults to judgment as a matter of law, it is not necessary to
reach the issue in this case because the parties' knowledge was coupled with affirmative
acts by the Holdens, including their verbal acknowledgements of the boundary and offers
to exchange property.
2

boundary by acquiescence if he or his predecessors in title had reason to know the true
location of the boundary during the period of acquiescence." Id. at 421, quoting Halladay
v. Guff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). If ancient surveys had disappeared, or landowners
were deceased, a claim might fail as a matter of law. Id.
In rejecting the additional element, this Court recognized the difficulty of
satisfying that high burden of proof. The Court noted that, to satisfy Halladay, "there
must have been a particular form of dispute. The dispute may not be proved by evidence
of mere differences of opinion or by a mere lack of actual knowledge of the true location
of the boundary." Id. (emphasis added).
As the Court of Appeals recognized in Wilkinson, this Court's recognition of the
impracticalities caused by Halladay's restrictive burden in no way eliminated the
significance of actual knowledge. {See Brief of Appellants at 25). Indeed, deeming
actual knowledge by both parties entirely irrelevant would seem to defeat the purpose of
the doctrine, which is to resolve boundary disputes.
In any event, the Holdens are precluded as a matter of law from claiming
acquiescence, because they occupied the Ault farm pursuant to lease and management
agreements. The Holdens now claim for the first time that the management agreements
they had with the Aults "in reality" only covered certain portions of the farm and,
conveniently, not the portions of the farm in dispute. "[T]here are no credible facts which
support that any lease existed for the disputed property," the Holdens state, ignoring the
Aults' record citations - which consist entirely of the Holdens' Verified Answer, Mr.

3

Holden's affidavit, and Mr. Holden's deposition testimony. (See Brief of Appellants at
12). For example:
•

The Complaint alleged:

"[The Holdens] leased the Ault Property from

approximately 1972 through 1977 and again from approximately 1982 to 1977. . . . At
various times during the time the Aults have owned the property in question, the Holdens
have unlawfully trespassed on said property by, among other things, building structures
on the Ault property, storing personal property on the Ault property without permission,
and illegally entering said property." (R. 6 ^ 9, R. 4 ^ 29).
The Holdens responded in their Verified Answer: " Admit so much of paragraph 9
as alleges that Darrell C. Holden leased property from Leo Ault from approximately 1972
through 1977, but deny the balance of said paragraph. Further answering paragraph 9,
Holden has managed property allegedly owned by Leo H. Ault, as an agent for Ault, who
is an absentee landowner residing in Utah County, at various times subsequent to 1977,
but not pursuant to lease thereto." (R. 19 U 7) (emphasis added).
•

In an affidavit, Mr. Holden repeated the foregoing statement, and added:

"Affiant did not trespass on the property allegedly owned by Ault, and could not do so
because of said lease, acknowledged in the Complaint, and management agreements."
(R. 137 K 8, R. 392 ^ 8) (emphasis added).
• In his deposition, Mr. Holden testified that he leased "the farm," "the whole
place," which encompassed the entire "20-something acres" of the Aults' property
(excluding the house itself). (R. 689 line 25 - R. 684 line 9). Holden testified that the
written lease terminated in 1977, and that he then had use of the property "every year
4

from 1982 to 1997" through a verbal agreement in which "he [Ault] asked me to manage
and take care of his place." (R. 685 line 10 - R. 684 line 25).
Nowhere in the record below was there any suggestion by the Holdens that their
lease and management agreements encompassed anything but the entire Ault farm, which
would include the areas in dispute. Indeed, the Holdens expressly relied upon those
agreements to disclaim liability for trespass on the disputed property. In connection with
their motion below, the Holdens wrote, "The trespass claim in the Fourth Cause of Action
is totally without factual basis. Ault has alleged that Holden was his lessee, and Holden
agrees that he was lessee during part of the period alleged and manager of the Ault
property during other periods. Holden could not, therefore, be a 'trespasser,' and the
Court can so conclude as a matter of law." (R. 426) (emphasis added).
The uncontroverted record is that the Holdens occupied or had permission to use
the Auks' farm from 1972 through 1977, and again from 1982 through 1997, by virtue of
lease and management agreements entered into with the Aults. The Holdens do not
dispute the authority, cited in Aults' opening brief, that such permissive use cannot be
deemed acquiescence. (Brief of Appellants at 27-29).
B.

For at least 20 years.

In their brief, the Holdens apparently do not contest the proposition that periods of
time during which they occupied the Aults' property by virtue of a lease or management
agreement cannot count toward the 20-year minimum. Rather, they merely restate their
new (and unsupported) contention that the lease and management agreements

5

encompassed portions of the Aults' farm other than the disputed areas, which has been
addressed above.
Significantly, the Holdens offer no response to the point that, if Judge Young's
ruling is correct that the Aults' alleged acquiescence began in 1978, the 20 years cannot
be met regardless of the lease/management agreements. It is undisputed that the Aults
ordered the Holdens off their property in 1997 (see Brief of Appellants at 13) — 19 years
from the commencement date found by the trial court.
The Aults further submit that the period of (alleged) acquiescence recommences
with each conversation between Mr. Ault and Mr. Holden in which the latter
acknowledged the correct boundary. There is no Utah case law holding that a landowner
must take physical, rather than verbal, action to restart the clock.
The basic principle of this case is that boundary by acquiescence was never
intended to reward a party for misleading his neighbor.

The Holdens consistently

acknowledged over the years that the property did not belong to them. They offered to
trade for it. They entered into lease and management agreements for the whole Ault farm,
which included the disputed property. They signed a deed which defined their north line
as the Aults' south line. They had surveys which showed the true boundary.
The facts are uncontroverted, and demonstrate the inappropriateness of invoking
boundary by acquiescence principles in this case. Penalizing the Aults for believing the
Holdens' representations would further no public policy, and would serve only to foster —
indeed, require -- distrust between landowners, who could no longer safely allow the use
of their property in reliance upon their neighbor's word.
6

II.

THE HOLDENS CANNOT CLAIM TITLE TO THE
DISPUTED PROPERTY MERELY BECAUSE THE AULTS'
DEED DOES NOT CLOSE, OR BECAUSE OF THE
HOLDENS' ALLEGED "POSSESSORY" RIGHTS.

A.

The Ault deed's failure to close is immaterial.

The Holdens continue to take the rather disconcerting position that, even if they
have no legitimate claim to the disputed property otherwise, they are still entitled to have
ownership transferred to them because the Auks' deed fails to close, even if the failure is
in a completely different location. (The area which fails to close is in the northwest
corner of the Ault property, whereas the strip is on the south side. See Jensen Survey,
Appellants' Addendum Exhibit 7).
As an initial matter, a potentially misleading statement in the Holdens' brief should
be clarified. The brief states that, by failing to close, the Ault deed describes nothing at
all, "and certainly nothing adverse to or inconsistent with the Holdens' prior recorded
title." (Brief of Appellees at 23). From that language, it might be inferred that the
Holdens' title somehow overlaps with or includes the disputed portion of the Ault
property. It is, however, undisputed that the Holdens' deed does not encompass the
disputed property and, in fact, that their deed expressly defines their northern boundary as
"the South line of the A. M. Ross and C. M. Plant property" (which the Holdens
acknowledge is the Ault property). The Holdens have never claimed that the terms of
their deed describe the disputed property; rather, they claim ownership "solely by virtue
of long standing possession independent of record title." (R. 107).
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With that clarification noted, the fallacy of the Holdens' argument becomes
apparent. Parties who have no claim to a piece of property, either through record title or
boundary by acquiescence (or adverse possession), cannot simply lay claim to another's
property if they happen to find a failure to close in the other's deed. The Holdens cite no
authority from Utah or anywhere else for the remarkable proposition that mere failure to
close anywhere in a deed suddenly renders the landowner's property up for grabs.
Because of that principle, the Holdens' contention that the failure to close renders
the Aults' deed imprecise is immaterial, but is nonetheless in error. The Holdens rely
primarily upon Howard v. Howard, 12 Utah 2d 193, 367 P.2d 193 (1962), and Drazich v.
Lasson, 964 P.2d 324 (Utah 1998), but neglect to address the obvious differences in those
cases pointed out in appellants' opening brief. For example, the parties in Drazich had
competing deeds with overlapping descriptions, and used as a critical marker a railroad
track which could no longer be located. Obviously, those circumstances rendered the
boundaries incapable of being determined with precision. Similarly, the deed in Howard
was incomprehensible, even to the point of purporting to convey only about half the
acreage that was actually involved.
The Holdens downplay Howard's discussion of Losee v. Jones, 120 Utah 385, 235
P.2d 132 (1951), and this Court's recognition in Colman v. Butkovich, 556 P.2d 503
(Utah 1976), that a deed that fails to close nonetheless may be sufficiently precise if
reasonable inferences can be drawn, such as from the words "to the place of beginning."

2

In their brief, the Holdens seek to recharacterize the Aults' argument into a claim of
8

See Losee, 235 P.2d at 137. As described more fully in appellants' opening brief, the
intent of the Ault deed is clear from its language. (Brief of Appellants at 33-34).
B.

The "race to the registry" is irrelevant when two deeds do not conflict.

The Holdens continue to make much of the fact that their deed was recorded in
1973, whereas the Aults' deed was recorded in 1974 . Acknowledging that recording
dates of the deeds is material only "as to any conflict between the two," the Holdens then
fail to identify any conflict between the two.
Instead, the Holdens simply allege that "the South line of the Plant property"
referred to in their deed is not really the line, but the fence. The Holdens offer no citation
for that proposition, and in fact make what can only be characterized as a
misrepresentation, stating: "The pleadings establish that . . . for more than sixty-nine
years according to the Pehrson sworn statement (R. 396), the north boundary of the Plant
property was the boundary fence."

(Brief of Appellees at 28). As pointed out in

appellants' opening brief, the statement of Mr. Pehrson said nothing more than that a

mutual mistake. As should be evident from their discussion of Losee and Colman,
however, the Aults need not claim mutual mistake because the deed can be construed with
reasonable precision, taking into account its terms "and reasonable inferences therefrom."
Colman, 556 P.2d at 505. The Holdens then complain that the Aults seek to "construe"
the deed "to close." Again, the Holdens seem to miss the Aults' point, which is that
failure to close is irrelevant when a deed, including language "to the place of beginning"
and other factors, is nonetheless sufficiently precise.
It appears that a 1975 recordation date was originally injected into the underlying
litigation in error and then perpetrated, but the correct date is August 22, 1974. A copy of
the Ault deed with the recorder's stamp is at R. 87.
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fence had existed, not that it was the boundary and, in fact, Mr. Pehrson testified that he
had "no knowledge whatsoever" where the boundary line was. (R. 251, R. 467). The
mere existence of a fence, which the Holdens acknowledge was not erected as a
boundary, does not support the contention that "the Holden deed describes the [disputed]
property."
III.

FACT ISSUES EXISTED WITH RESPECT TO PLAINTIFFS'
OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION.

The Holdens acknowledge that the Auks' complaint contained causes of action for
unjust enrichment and conversion arising out of the Holdens' unauthorized use of the
Aults' water rights and pipe. As noted in appellants' initial brief, the only argument
raised by the Holdens in the court below against those claims was that they could not be
maintained because water belongs to the sovereign, and the pipe was capable of being
retrieved. {See Brief of Appellants at 39-42).
On appeal, the Holdens appear to have abandoned those contentions, instead
arguing for the first time that "the factual basis for these claims is very weak," and that
the Aults never undertook discovery to establish the claims. {Id. at 31) Of course, the
Aults did not need to undertake discovery; their own eyewitness testimony at trial would
have been more than sufficient. In any event, though, the Holdens cannot now raise for
the first time a challenge to evidentiary sufficiency, particularly when they adduced no
evidence under U.R.Civ.P 56 and the lower court made no determinations.
The Holdens also argue that the Aults' claims for conversion and unjust
enrichment of pipe were somehow subsumed in the boundary question. The claims are
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factually and legally distinct. A dispute over personal property is wholly different from a
dispute over real property, and the trial court erred in summarily dismissing those claims.
Additionally, the Aults' trespass claim would encompass conduct occurring after the
Holdens were ordered off the property in 1997. (R. 4). Unless the Holdens are awarded
the disputed property, the Aults' trespass claim would remain viable.
IV.

THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN IMPOSING SANCTIONS
AGAINST THE AULTS, BECAUSE THEIR CLAIMS WERE
BOTH MERITORIOUS AND BROUGHT IN GOOD FAITH.

In seeking to justify the statutory attorney fee award, the Holdens make a raft of
untrue, unsupported, and/or disputed factual assertions, all of which ignore the principle
that, at the summary judgment stage, the Aults were entitled to have factual inferences
resolved in their favor.. Instead, the Holdens proclaim that "[t]he file is replete with bad
faith by plaintiffs," setting forth seven alleged examples:
First, the Aults' complaint shows, on its face, that they were without title for the dual
reasons that the conveyance alleged failed to close and, if it had, was subject to the
rights of parties in possession, the Holdens. Pursuit of a complaint not even alleging
title, the basic and first element of any quiet title action is the epitome of lack of
merit. (Brief of Appellees at 33).
This bald assertion has several defects. First, it is based upon an argument that
was never addressed by the trial court, and was instead simply inserted by the Holdens
into proposed findings and signed by the judge without any indication of the court's
independent reasoning. Indeed, the court had previously rejected an attempt to have the
complaint dismissed on these same grounds, denying the Holdens' earlier Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings. (R. 208-07, R. 809 at 28-29). The assertion also disregards
the extensive legal argument and case law adduced by the Aults in support of their
11

position. Whether this Court ultimately agrees with the Auks' arguments is far different
from suggesting that the arguments are entirely without legal basis.
Second, the Auks' complaint, together with the answers to discovery, establish the
elements of boundary by acquiescence in favor of the Holdens. (Brief of Appellee
at 33).
This assertion is, of course, the principal issue on appeal. Regardless of how this
Court rules, several undisputed facts rendered the Aults' lawsuit reasonable, including:
The Holdens were aware of surveys confirming the actual boundary; the Aults' deed
encompasses the disputed land, and the Holdens' deed does not; the Holdens
acknowledged to the Aults at least twice (in 1978 and 1990) that the strip belonged to the
Aults, and even sought to trade for the strip; and the fence was not erected to demarcate
the boundary, but rather a livestock lane. Although the Holdens disclaim it in their brief,
the above assertion is nothing more than a suggestion that sanctions are available merely
because they prevailed on summary judgment. This Court has rejected such a strict
liability reading of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. {See Brief of Appellants at 43-45).
Third, the file shows that the Aults' [sic] resorted to self-help prior to the filing of
the complaint and resorted to self-help a second time after the filing of the
complaint, in disregard of the jurisdiction of the trial court, by going on the property
and removing and altering the fences. (Brief of Appellees at 33)
This assertion fails to take into account the factual circumstances surrounding
these issues. With respect to the removal of part of a fence on the west on November 25,
1998, it was non-confrontational in nature, and occurred prior of the filing of litigation.
With respect to the allegation that Mr. Ault attempted to remove another portion of fence
on December 18, 1998, the findings submitted by the Holdens acknowledged that Mr.
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Ault denied their version of events, yet essentially rendered a finding of fact in their own
favor.

(R. 510 ^f 34). There was no order in effect at the time, the property was

reasonably believed to be the Aults', and the Holdens had previously come onto the
Aults' land and damaged their property.
The Aults' testimony, which must be assumed true at the summary judgment stage,
was that the defendants fired a gunshot at the Aults' caretaker, that Mrs. Holden screamed
at and threatened the caretaker, that the Holdens entered the Aults' property, pulled the
Aults' large water pump into the middle of Aults' hay field and flattened its tires and
otherwise disabled the pump, that the Holdens' son in the presence of Mr. Holden
threatened Mr. Ault, that the Holdens' son, again with the knowledge of the defendants,
jumped the fence and pounded and jerked on fence posts and shouted a profanity at Mr.
Ault, and that Mr. Holden violated the court's status quo order by erecting a new fence on
the property. (R. 172-70, 167-64).
An award of attorney fees cannot be justified on alleged misconduct by one party
that is disputed, that has never been ruled upon by a court, and that has occurred with
equal or greater frequency by the opposing party. This contention lends no support to the
award.
Fourth, the trial court entered a temporary restraining order as a result of the Aults
attempt at self help which direct [sic] them to not go on the property or disturb the
fences. (Brief of Appellees at 33)
Citation to this ground to support an attorney fee award borders on disingenuous.
The Holdens filed a motion for a temporary restraining order on December 22, 1998 -
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after having been informed that the Aults' counsel was out of town until December 28 —
and obtained Judge Dever's signature ex parte. (R. 45 \ 9, R. 46 \ 11).
One day after returning, Auks' counsel agreed to a stipulation to retain the terms
of the temporary order. (R. 67) The trial court never ruled on the merits of the motion,
and no problems occurred after the stipulation. (R. 809 at 31). This assertion offers no
support for the fee award.
Fifth, the Aults disregarded the temporary order by going on the property and
attempting to construct a new fence, resulting in a motion for an order to show
cause why the Aults should not be held in contempt. (Memorandum, p. 2).
Again, the Holdens ignore the fact that Mr. Ault's testimony, assumed true for
purposes of summary judgment, was to the contrary. It is also inappropriate to cite the
mere filing of a motion when no court ever ruled on it. (The Holdens acknowledged
below that the motion was rendered moot by the court's order that the parties not cross
the fence line pending resolution of the case. (R. 567)).
Sixth, the Aults conducted abusive discovery for the purpose of running up costs.
(Brief of Appellees at 33).
This statement is mystifying. Throughout the entirety of the lawsuit, the Aults
submitted a single set of 17 interrogatories and a single request for production of
documents numbering 11 requests.

The depositions of all fact witnesses and parties

(including that of Mr. Ault taken by the Holdens) were completed in a total of one and a
half days. (R. 216, 285).

4

Pursuant to local rules, the Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents
themselves are not in the record, but appellants do not believe the Holdens will dispute
14

To suggest that the Aults conducted "abusive" discovery is incomprehensible.
Moreover, the correct approach for addressing such a claim would have been through
U.R.Civ.P. 37, or by seeking a protective order under U.R.Civ.P. 26. See, e.g., U.R.Civ.P.
11 (rule "do[es] not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and
motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37").
Seventh, before the filing of the suit, Mr. Ault told Mr. Holden that he (Holden) could
not afford to fight a quiet title action. (Brief of Appellees at 33, citing R. 566).
This averment is simply false. The Holdens offer no citation for it (R. 566 is an
earlier memorandum containing the same statement, again without citation), and the
omission is understandable, because it was actually Mr. Holden who said he would not have
to incur any legal fees if a suit were filed. It was also Mr. Holden who insisted that Mr.
Ault "make the first move". Conversely, as demonstrated by a telephone conversation
taped by Mr. Holden, it was Mr. Ault who reminded Mr. Holden that the Holdens had
originally requested to trade another piece of their property for the disputed strip, Mr. Ault
who suggested a reasonable compromise (a 50-50 division of the land at issue), and Mr.
Ault who repeatedly said he would prefer to find a mutually agreeable solution to avoid
litigation:
LA [hereinafter Ault]: Okay. On the line down here first thing. What do you want
to do about this. At one time you were going to trade me.
DH [hereinafter Holden]: Well, I talked to my attorney and he said to go ahead and
let you make the first move.

their content.
15

Ault: Okay. I'll file suit against you Darrell. That's going to cost us both about
$15,000 - if you want to do that.
Holden: It ain't going to cost me nothing because I've already been to Legal Aid
and they'll represent me for good.
Ault: Well good. That's okay. That's fine. I'm just calling to see if you want to
work something out. If you don't then I'm going to [Mr. Holden interrupts to begin discussion about pipe dispute.]
*

*

*

Ault: Okay. If you don't want to work with me here on this fine. I'll just do what I
have to do.
Holden: Maybe you ought to go down and talk to my attorney.
Ault: (inaudible) - talk to your attorney. (

) friends to you, I mean I don't

want to do that, but if you want me to that's what I'll do.
(R. 586, 584).
Mr. Ault suggested that each party compromise by accepting half of the disputed 30foot strip. That solution would allow Mr. Holden to retain the shed he had built on the
property, and Mr. Ault agreed that he would deed over the half:
Ault: If you don't want to do that, then I'll just have to do what I have to do. I don't
want to do that.
Holden: Why do you want a lane here?
Ault: Because I cannot take anything heavy down this (

) part. (Inaudible).

Holden: Well, how about if I ponder on this a little bit and think about it.
Ault: That's fine. You go talk to your attorney and do whatever you want to do
Darrell. (Inaudible) I'll just split the difference with you. We'll go down 15 feet.
I'll miss your barn. The barn's over there 12 feet, then I go 12 feet (
) or
whatever it is. I don't want your bam, and I wouldn't want anybody to take my bam.
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Ault: (Inaudible) Just talk it over - I don't know how I could be more fair. If I go
the other way it'll just mean money to me I guess. It's just an income tax deduction
anyway. But I would try to get along. I don't want to take your barn. Even if I went
the other way I wouldn't take your barn.
Holden: Well, let me go and talk to the wife and by Monday we can probably have a
decision and then we can get with you. All right. By Monday we'll have some kind
of an understanding. But you did say that if we go ahead and do this thing, you will
put the fence in—
Ault: I will.
Holden: And you will go ahead and get the deeds amended to what we agree on.
Ault: I will.
(R.574, 570-69; emphasis added.)
The Holdens' implication that the Aults filed suit as some sort of economic extortion
is completely baseless. The record supports a finding of neither lack of merit nor bad faith
by the Aults, and the statutory fee award should be reversed.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING COSTS,

A.

The memorandum was untimely.

There is no dispute that judgment was entered in this case on July 18, 2000, and
that the memorandum of costs was not filed until August 1, 2000, beyond the period
allowed under U.R.Civ.P. 5.
The only excuse offered by the Holdens is that the court clerk sent the judge's
ruling to the Holden's former counsel, who did not forward it to the Holdens until there
was little time left to meet the 5-day requirement. The Holdens do not suggest that they
ever checked with the court themselves (unlike the parties in Board of Commissioners v.
17

Petersen, 937 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1997)), even though they knew that their attorney had
withdrawn and that the proposed judgment had been submitted to the court for signature
on June 26, 2000. (R. 493-92, copied to the Holdens).5 (Ironically, the Holdens complain
that the clerk sent the conformed judgment to Mr. Nielsen, yet a pre-addressed envelope
with Mr. Nielsen's name on it had been submitted to the clerk for that very purpose.) (R.
491).
The clerk mailed out the ruling the same day the judgment was entered, July 18,
2000. Assuming a three-day mailing period, Mr. Nielsen received the notice in ample
time to contact the Holdens before the Rule 5 deadline (July 26) passed. Instead, he
chose to mail the ruling out to the Holdens on July 25. That decision, and that of the
Holdens not to check with the court themselves, are not the Aults' responsibility. The
memorandum of costs was untimely, and it should have been rejected.
B.

The memorandum did not establish reasonableness or necessity.

To recover costs, a claimant must not only identify costs, but establish their
reasonableness and necessity. The Holdens claim that a general averment is sufficient,
but this Court has required more than mere quotation of the rule. Peterson, 937 P.2d at

5

The Aults' counsel had sent the Holdens a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel long
before the court ruled. (R. 503). Mr. Nielsen also appeared to continue providing legal
advice to the Holdens. In his letter of July 25, 2000, for example, he enclosed a proposed
Notice of Judgment form for the Holdens to file. Although Mr. Nielsen told the Holdens
in that letter that they were entitled to claim costs, he did not inform them that their
deadline was the following day, instead advising them. "You should have your new
attorney, whoever that may be, take care of that matter." (R. 550).
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1272; Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980). The Holdens' memorandum made
no such effort, and was legally insufficient on its face.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, appellants Leo and Virginia Ault respectfully
request that the order granting summary judgment be reversed and that the case be
remanded. Appellants request that the trial court be directed to enter judgment for the
Aults on their First Cause of Action (Quiet Title), and to allow the Aults to proceed to
trial on their other causes of action.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this fe^ day of March, 2001.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

William J. Hansen
Karra J. Porter
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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